Nonexistent Objects

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TO MY PARENTS
without whom I might have been one
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Alexius Meinong was an Austrian philosopher and psychologist who did most of his work around the turn of the century. He believed that he had discovered a whole realm of objects which had not been studied previously by philosophers or by scientists. These are the objects that don’t exist. As examples he cited the golden mountain—it doesn’t exist, and it has certainly not been extensively scrutinized by serious scholars—and the round square, which not only does not exist but also has the interesting property of being impossible.

I first became acquainted with Meinong’s views when I was slated to teach a course on metaphysics at the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle during the fall of 1966. My intent was to impart to the class the wisdom I had recently gained as a graduate student, and a nice vehicle for this was to be W. V. Quine’s essay, “On What There Is.” I feared, however, that the students would find the discussion there too abstract unless they were already familiar with the views that Quine was opposing in the first few pages of his essay: they would appreciate Quine’s applications of Occam’s Razor more if they were already familiar with the engaging but obscure theory against which it was being wielded. I had been told that Quine’s character “Wyman” was based on the historical Meinong, and so I selected Meinong’s “The Theory of Objects” as an initial reading.

Meinong’s views had a profound impact on me. At first, I was convinced by the criticisms leveled against him by Russell and Quine; in fact, I first thought of these “refutations” as
constituting one of the clearest examples of philosophical progress that we have. Clear progress is rare in philosophy, and I was pleased to have an example to cite. But as I thought about it more, I became increasingly dissatisfied. I found the criticisms intellectually compelling, but I kept thinking that there was something very true in Meinong's views that was being missed. And eventually I began working out a similar kind of theory, a theory that I thought preserved most of Meinong's radical and exciting ontological views—such as the belief in nonexistent objects, even in impossible objects—but a theory that is immune to the standard criticisms. That theory was developed gradually in a series of papers and talks, and the present book represents its most recent form.

This is not an exposition of Meinong. Although I have gained much in inspiration and ideas from reading his work, I am not well enough acquainted with his voluminous writings to qualify as an expert on them. From time to time I will discuss gross similarities and differences between Meinong's views and those presented here, but for the most part I will simply treat Meinong as an ally who had many of the ideas first.

I was most influenced in the early stages of my work by a manuscript by Richard Routley entitled "Exploring Meinong's Jungle," a work that is, I suspect, closer to Meinong's views than is my own. I have not tried to draw detailed comparisons between Routley's work and my own, and the same goes for many other contemporary writers on related topics. Such comparisons would have required too much work and probably have been out of date by the time this is published. Likewise, I have not tried to catalogue the ways in which the present work coheres with or departs from my own earlier work. I intend this book to be an independent work, readable on its own.

My goal has been to put forth a certain kind of theory of nonexistent objects. I realize that both the theory and its exposition are somewhat crude. If the theory is of any value, it will doubtless be developed by others in ways that I do not at present envisage, and it seems to me time to place it in their hands. As for the exposition, I ask the reader to try to see past any poor choices of terminology and minor blunders. This burden will fall heaviest on those who are not in sympathy with the idioms and presumptions of current professional "analytic" philosophy. I've tried to make the main ideas of the book accessible to a broader audience, especially in the introduction and part I.

I have benefited enormously from numerous discussions with students and colleagues and with people outside academia altogether. In addition to those persons mentioned in the text, I have received special support and help from Kit Fine, Edmund Gettier, Gael Janofsky, Kathryn Pyne Parsons, Barbara Partee, Robert Sleigh, David Woodruff Smith, John Vickers, and, most of all, from Karel Lambert. They helped in various ways, mostly by keeping me honest by one means or another.

I am grateful for a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities which, together with a sabbatical leave from the University of Massachusetts (Amherst), gave me a year's free time in which to write this book, and I wish to thank the Philosophy Department at the University of California at Irvine for providing office facilities and hospitality during that period.

University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Massachusetts
December 1978
Introduction

Are there objects that don't exist? The orthodox, mainstream answer (in Anglo-American philosophy, anyway) is a resounding “No!”—there’s no such thing as a thing that doesn’t exist. Though there may be kinds of things that are nowhere exemplified (e.g., being a winged horse) there is no particular thing that fails to exist.” Or, put in positive terms: “everything exists.”

This is a central tenet of contemporary philosophy. I’m inclined to call it the “Russellian rut”: “Russellian” because it stems principally from Russell, and a “rut” because it’s a view in which most of us are so entrenched that it’s hard to see over the edges. The view is defended (though obliquely) in Russell’s classic paper, “On Denoting”; published in 1905, this paper also contains Russell’s most terse and unsympathetic treatment of Meinong. (It is unfortunate that most people are acquainted with Meinong only as the bad guy in this paper of Russell’s, for Russell published several reviews of Meinong’s work which were much more sympathetic, some even containing lavish praise).²

1. All references are to the bibliography at the end of the book. Most references will be given in the text by means of the author’s last name followed by an abbreviation of the title of the work in square brackets; for example, a reference to Russell’s article “On Denoting” would be given as “Russell [OD],” possibly followed by page references. The author’s name will be omitted if it is clear from the context.

2. For example, “Before entering upon details, I wish to emphasize the admirable method of Meinong’s researches” ([1904 Review] p. 203) and “Meinong’s present position appears to me clear and consistent and fruitful of valuable results for philosophy” ([1905 Review] p. 539).
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‘Rut’ has an unfavorable connotation; the same point can be put more favorably. I believe that, until recently, at least, philosophy has been in a state that Kuhn ([SSR]) calls “normal science.” We have a set of paradigm beliefs and techniques which we work with, and work with very fruitfully, but that we normally do not seriously question. One of these key beliefs is that everything exists, and one of the paradigm techniques, in metaphysics, if not in the philosophy of language so much anymore, is Russell’s famous theory of descriptions (which was first presented in the paper mentioned above). In this introduction I want to discuss how such a situation arose, and then I want to examine the current scene in more detail. This should set the stage for the departure from orthodoxy envisaged in the body of the book.

1. Historical Development

In 1900 Bertrand Russell believed in nonexistent objects, a view he says he got from G. E. Moore (Russell [POM] p. xviii). And indeed, superficially, it’s quite a plausible view. If we forget or inhibit our philosophical training for the moment, we are all prepared to cite examples of nonexistent objects: Pegasus, Sherlock Holmes, unicorns, centaurs, . . . . Those are all possible objects, but we can find examples of impossible ones, too; Quine’s example of the round square cupola on Berkeley College will do. It is an impossible object, and it certainly doesn’t exist, so it seems to be an example of an impossible nonexistent object. With so many examples at hand, what is more natural than to conclude that there are nonexistent objects—lots of them!

Well, by 1919 at least, Russell had changed his mind. Nonexistent objects offend against our “robust sense of reality,” and the main task of the metaphysician seems to be to explain away the apparent examples without committing himself to objects that don’t exist ([LMP] p. 170). And the theory of descriptions, as all philosophers learn in graduate school, if not sooner, provides a means for doing that.3

3. The theory of descriptions is essentially a method for paraphrasing

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Most of Western philosophy has agreed with Russell ever since. Why? The question has a certain poignancy. For in adopting the theory of descriptions (at least as Russell originally presented it in “On Denoting”), we paid a rather high price for avoiding nonexistent entities. Formerly, we could think of a statement such as ‘Pegasus is winged’ as a simple predication, true if the object named is winged and false otherwise. To use the theory of descriptions to eliminate the “apparent” reference to Pegasus, we first assume that ‘Pegasus’ is, logically speaking, not a name at all, but rather a kind-of code for ‘the winged horse of Greek mythology’ (or perhaps just ‘the Pegasizer” as in Quine [OWTJ]); then we say that this description, which logically underlies the apparent name, is not itself a constituent of the proposition at all, but that the entire sentence really means something like ‘Some existing thing is a winged horse, and is the only existing winged horse, and is winged’. This is hardly an intuitive result, and it doesn’t even accord well with the apparent data. For one thing, it makes all simple sentences containing certain English locutions into the terminology of symbolic logic (or into literal English renderings of that terminology). Its most famous application involves the word ‘the’. A sentence involving this word gets paraphrased, roughly, by means of the format:

‘. . . the A . . . ’ ⇒ ‘Something is such that it is an A, and nothing else is an A, and . . . it . . . ’. For example, ‘The king of France is bald’ would be paraphrased as ‘Something is such that it is a king of France, and nothing else is a king of France, and it is bald’ (where ‘is bald’ occupies the position of the ellipses in the format). On its orthodox construal, you are to read the ‘something’ as ‘some existing thing’ and the ‘nothing else’ as ‘no other existing thing’, though this construal is really independent of the paraphrase method. The main advantage of the theory is supposed to be that it allows us to replace a sentence that contains a term, ‘the A’, which apparently refers to something, by a sentence which does not contain such a term. The latter sentence can then be denied without the denier having to (apparently, anyway) refer to ‘the A’. Thus someone who does not believe in the king of France can comfortably avoid the apparent commitment to such a king that is suggested by ‘The king of France is not bald’ by saying instead: ‘It is not the case that something is such that it is a king of France, and nothing else is, and it is bald’. Russell also held that English proper names are disguised definite descriptions, to which the paraphrase should be applied (see below in the text for an example); he and others hoped to extend this treatment to all sorts of other linguistic constructions (see Urnson [PA] chaps. 3, 4, 10).
names of nonexistents false, a matter that has been controversial ever since it was proposed. And, worse, it seems not to work at all for one of Russell’s own paradigm tests: the sentence ‘George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley’ is said to mean ‘George IV wished to know whether one and only one man wrote Waverley and Scott was that man’, a result that hardly anyone finds plausible.\(^4\)

So why did Anglo-American philosophy follow Russell instead of Meinong? I do not believe that it was because of our “robust sense of reality.” For one thing, the issue doesn’t concern reality, but rather unreality; it is not what exists that is in question, but rather whether there is something more, something outside the realm of existence. And, for another, I think that our intuitions are genuinely in conflict on this matter. We do tend to focus on what exists, if this is what a robust sense of reality comes to. But we also have a contrary tendency to believe in particular examples of nonexistent objects, such as Pegasus and Sherlock Holmes.

No, I think we had much better reasons for agreeing with Russell—at least two. The first is that the contrary view—a Meinongian bloated ontology—seemed inevitably plagued with difficulties, absurdities, and outright inconsistencies. I’ve mentioned Russell’s attacks on Meinong’s theories. Well, Russell argued very effectively against Meinong. And Meinong did not provide a persuasive reply. (I believe that Meinong’s reply was correct in part, but his reply was not persuasive).\(^5\) Thus we inherited the belief that, whatever its initial plausibility, an endorsement of nonexistent entities is untenable.

The second reason for following Russell was this: Russell took the view that everything exists, plus his theory of descriptions, and on this foundation he erected one of the most impressive philosophical systems ever known. He made great strides in the development of modern logic, he provided a kind of foundation for mathematics, and he articulated very powerful and interesting metaphysical and epistemological views. More than that, the techniques he employed—principally modern logic supplemented by the theory of descriptions—turned out to have widespread application far beyond Russell’s own theories. No wonder, then, that we inherited many of his ontological views along with the rest.

2. The Current Scene

Let me repeat my view of the current scene. Metaphysically, we are just beginning to emerge from a state of “normal science.” Normal science is characterized by the existence of certain paradigm views which are simply taken for granted—and taken for granted in such a way that it is hard to see what it would be like to deny them. I’ve identified the view that everything exists as one of these.

Now that may sound presumptuous. After all, people have published books and articles in which they raise the question whether there might be things that don’t exist. They usually conclude that the answer is no, of course; but they do raise the question. Well, that’s not my point; my point is that in the normal everyday functioning of philosophy it is taken as a truism that there are no nonexistent objects.

Let me illustrate this with a very simple example. In a recent article, Keith Donnellan discusses a certain principle about names, and he speaks in favor of this principle as follows: “it does not involve our theory of reference in any difficulties: . . . it has Meinongian implications, no overpopulation with entities whose existence is being denied” ([SV] p. 26). In other words, Donnellan takes for granted that Meinongian theories are bad, and that nonexistent objects are bad. And this is not a rhetorical error of his—quite the opposite. You can’t defend everything you say, and he is aware that he’s addressing an audience that agrees with him in taking those things for granted. (The literature abounds with other examples.)

Here is a different illustration of the same point. It is rela-
tively common to teach elementary logic in a manner that presupposes the orthodox view. In particular, when students are asked to symbolize these sentences:

(a) Tables exist.
(b) There are tables.

the instructor expects the same symbolization, namely:

(c) (\exists x) Tx.

And this expectation is not presented as embodying a metaphysical view that might be wrong; instead it is treated as a matter of pure logic. But it is not pure logic. Symbolizing both (a) and (b) in the same way amounts to equating the quantifier 'there is' with the quantifier 'there exists', an equation which makes sense only if what exists exhausts what there is; and that is the metaphysical view I am now questioning. 6

This example from logic also illustrates another point: why, from the orthodox point of view, it is hard to see as sensible the question whether there are things that don't exist. If you symbolize this in the customary fashion, it comes out synonymous with 'there exist things that don't exist', and that is inconsistent on anybody's view. But, of course, such a symbolization begs the question at issue.

The matter is actually a bit more complicated than I have indicated, for variations in word usage also enter in. In particular, I think that we sometimes use 'there are' to mean 'there exist'; when this is done, the symbolization discussed does not beg the question in any overt sense. But we also use 'there are' in a broader sense, a sense roughly equivalent to that of the word 'some', or 'at least one', and this usage cannot be appropriately symbolized in the same way as 'there exist'. For example, we are inclined to say both:

(d) There are winged horses—Pegasus, for example.
and:

(e) There are no winged horses.

When we truly utter (d), we are using 'there are' in the broad sense. When we say (e), we mean that there are no real winged horses, and (e) is appropriately symbolized using a quantifier that is read 'there exist'.

To avoid ambiguity, I will try always to use 'there are' in the unrestricted sense, the sense of 'at least one'; when I want to assert existence, I will use 'there exist' or some similar locution.

During certain periods of history (e.g., the Middle Ages) the view that everything exists would have been regarded as absolutely outrageous. But since the early 1900s it has become the received view, very firmly entrenched and almost impossible to refute. There are several reasons why it is almost immune to refutation. First, as the received view, it has authority on its side; it is endorsed or presupposed by those of our contemporaries whom we most respect. Also, as the received view, it is intuitively obvious (to many philosophers, anyway), our intuitions having been shaped by years of experience with theories that embody this view. These factors tend to throw the burden of proof on those who might want to challenge the received view. But that is almost impossible to do, for reasons that Kuhn and many others have made clear: the view in question is a high-level theoretical claim in our metaphysical scheme. And high-level theoretical claims don't confront the data directly; they can be tested against data only as interpreted by some method. And the orthodox view contains within it a methodology that interprets the data so as to preserve and protect the claim that everything exists. I've given

6. Quantifiers are locutions from symbolic logic. There are usually two, the universal quantifier '(x)', which means 'everything is such that ...' or 'for any object x, ...'; and the existential quantifier '(\exists x)', which means 'something is such that ...', or 'there is at least one thing such that ...', or 'for at least one thing x, ...':

7. The literature now contains numerous references to this distinction
one example above, the manner in which we use logic to symbolize claims so as to presuppose that everything exists. More important, we've all learned to use Russell's theory of descriptions to analyze away apparent reference to nonexistent objects; those beliefs that seem to require nonexistent objects for their truth we instinctively paraphrase into other beliefs that do not. And we retain our conviction that apparent reference to the unreal must be capable of being paraphrased away even when we don't see how to do it.

It may now come as a surprise that I have hardly any objection to this situation whatsoever. I think the orthodox view is a fine view; it has been extremely useful. I don't object to its taking things for granted, nor to its defending some of its central claims by means of a methodology that biases the data. I don't object because I think that any fruitful philosophical theory is going to do just that.

But I do think it's a rut, and I'd like to look over the edge and see how things might be different. To do this, we need to encounter an actual theory about nonexistent objects. That will be the task of the present work. The way has been paved by a recent mood in logic according to which logic ought not to rule out nonexistent objects (see Scott [AML]). But much of the motivation here has stemmed from the desire to preserve the neutrality of logic, and this very neutrality has prescribed silence about what nonexistent objects are substantively like. The same also holds for much work in "free logic":

Free logic validates certain reasoning containing words such as 'Pegasus'. But it does not follow from this fact that it is committed to a realm of entities among which is included a flying horse. To be sure, one could develop a philosophical semantics for free logic that does recognize a realm of non-actual but possible beings. . . . But one need not develop the semantics that way. . . . In our development, talk about non-existents is just that—"talk" is what is stressed. "Non-existent" object, for us, is just a picturesque way of speaking devoid of any ontological commitment. 8


3. Methodological Preliminaries

My intent is to describe in some detail the ontological commitment that these and other authors wish to avoid.

I have had certain goals in mind when working on this project, and it will aid the reader's understanding to be aware of them. For they have often influenced what I have said in ways that would not be apparent from my words alone.

One goal I have had is to try to develop a theory that is understandable to those who, like myself, approach this topic from what I have called the orthodox tradition. My techniques will be familiar to those in that tradition, and my terminology has been kept as familiar as possible; I have made efforts to clarify the nonorthodox terminology that I found it important to use (principal examples are the notions of nuclear and extra-nuclear properties, and impossible and incomplete objects). This goal has also guided me in producing a theory that is, in certain respects, as detailed and specific as possible. I have avoided many alternative theories and many variants of the chosen theory—not because they seemed to me to be wrong, but because I couldn't see how to develop them in sufficient detail to grasp clearly how they would go. I can't emphasize this point too much; although I have often taken a given path in order to avoid error that I saw elsewhere, I have much more often taken a particular approach just because it was the only one I could develop to the point where I felt comfortable with it. The reader who tries to find objections to alternatives lurking behind my choices will often be frustrated (though I do think it is often much more difficult to develop an alternative approach than it seems at first glance, and that "objection" to alternatives is often relevant). I don't mean to suggest, of course, that I have completely avoided vagueness and unclarity myself; these are matters of degree, and I have had as one of my goals to minimize them.

A second goal that I have had is to produce a theory that is inconsistent with the orthodox view. One popular style in philosophy is to take a position that initially appears outrageous, and then to "interpret" it in such a manner that it turns into something that we already believed. This is not what I am trying to do
here. If I am successful in my enterprise, some people who begin with orthodox opinions will end up agreeing with the theory presented here, but only because they have changed their minds, not because the theory is “really” one they originally held.

There is a danger that the question of whether there are objects that don’t exist should turn out to be a semantic quibble rather than a substantive matter of disagreement between Meinongians and the orthodoxy. There are at least two ways in which this might happen. First, we could define ‘exists’ to mean something like ‘has spatio-temporal location’, and then defend the claim that some things don’t exist by pointing to numbers, classes, ideas, or similar things. I want to avoid such a move. I am not sure how to define ‘exists’, but I may be able to say enough about my intended use of the word to forestall such a trivialization of the issues.

First, I want to follow Meinong in separating abstract things (e.g., numbers, properties, relations, propositions) from concrete things (tables, unicorns, people). Meinong held that abstract things never exist (they are the wrong sort of thing to exist); instead, some of them have a kind of being called subsistence. I want to avoid this issue entirely. When discussing problems of existence and nonexistence, I’ll limit myself entirely to a discussion of concrete objects. So when I say that some objects don’t exist, I mean that some concrete objects don’t exist—I don’t have in mind propositions, or numbers, or sets.

With regard to concrete objects, Meinong held that some of them exist and some of them don’t, and the ones that don’t do not have some other kind of being—for example, subsistence (see Meinong [TO], sec. 4, where he considers and rejects an argument that purports to establish a kind of being that all objects have). Russell objected that if there are objects that do not exist, they have to have some other kind of being (see [OD], [EIP]). I have never been able to find more than a terminological issue here. If there is an issue about whether nonexistent objects have some kind of being, I intend to remain neutral on the issue. This also goes for a view (which may be the same one) that I have often heard expressed in conversation; it is that “everything has its own special mode of existence.” For example, Pegasus exists in mythology, Sherlock Holmes exists in fiction, . . . . Some would even emphasize that these sorts of existence can be more important than the everyday sort of existence that I share with my house and my automobile. Well perhaps, but that is not the issue that I will be discussing in this book. There is a perfectly ordinary sense of the word ‘exists’ in which Sherlock Holmes does not exist, and that is the sense that I intend when I call Holmes a nonexistent object. This is also the sense in which orthodox philosophers claim that there is nothing except what exists. (This does not commit them to the unimportance of literature; they need only hold that the importance of literature does not depend on the existence of its characters.)

Even given these provisos, there is still room for disagreement concerning exactly what concrete objects exist—for example, concerning whether there exist any living beings on other planets. I am not concerned with these issues and so I will, as a matter of policy, agree (or at least not disagree) with others on these issues. Specifically, I intend to use the word ‘exists’ so that it encompasses exactly those objects that orthodox philosophers hold to exist. In particular, it includes all the ordinary physical objects that we normally take to exist, and it does not include unicorns, gold mountains, winged horses, round squares (round square things), Pegasus, or Sherlock Holmes. The theory given below will say that there are unicorns, there is such a thing as Pegasus, etc., but that none of these exist.

For reasons of simplicity, I have avoided entirely dealing with tensed properties in the theory. When I give examples like ‘being blue’, it would have been better to give examples like ‘being blue at time t’ or ‘being blue sometime’. My ‘exists’ is always meant tenselessly, so I take it to be true that Socrates exists (i.e., Socrates is not an example of a nonexistent object), even though it is perfectly correct English to say, ‘Socrates once existed, but he no longer does’. For those who prefer tenses here, read my ‘exists’ as short for ‘existed or exists or will exist’.

A second way that the ontological issues might be trivialized would be if I were to reveal in the last chapter that my quantifiers are merely “substitutional,” that “There are winged horses” is true only because the sentence ‘Pegasus is a winged horse’ is true,
and the latter sentence is true in spite of the fact that ‘Pegasus’
doesn’t refer at all. Don’t bother skipping ahead; I won’t do this.
Whenever there is a choice, my quantifiers are always intended
to be interpreted objectually. ⁹

A third goal of mine is that the theory described be consistent with
the data. This is too vague to be of much help, but it
can be formulated more precisely in terms of the relation
between the proposed theory and the orthodox view. This is that the
only point of disagreement between these views should be
explainable in terms of what some call a “robust sense of reality,”
and what Meinong called the “prejudice in favor of the actual.”
Namely, the views should agree on any issue which concerns only
existing objects. More specifically, there should be no disagree-
ment between them concerning the truth value of any sentence
whose quantifiers are all restricted to existing objects and whose
singular terms all name real objects. (The sentence “some things
do not exist” is not one of these.) Then the orthodox view can be
seen to be a kind of special case of the more libertine one developed
here; it is the libertine view with blinders on, blinders that
prevent vision of the unreal. Another way of putting this is that
the more libertine view should “reduce to” the orthodox view
when applied to old and familiar (i.e., real) objects in much the
same way that relativity theory and quantum physics reduce to
classical physics when applied only to slow-moving middle-sized
physical objects. This will be made clearer in chapter 6, section 2.

⁹ Quantifiers can be read in different ways. The usual reading is
the objectual reading: here a sentence of the form ‘There is an A’
is supposed to be true if, and only if, there is an object which
is an A. The substitutional reading treats ‘There is an A’ as being
true if, and only if, there is some true sentence of
the form ‘N is an A’, where ‘N’ is a name. In case every object has a name and
no names fail to refer, then the objectual and substitutional readings
are equivalent; otherwise, they need not be equivalent. For example, some
proponents of substitutional quantification assume that there are names which
fail to refer but which nonetheless appear in true sentences of the form ‘N is an
A’, and they then hold that some sentences of the form ‘There is an A’ are true
even though no object is an A. For example, Leonard (in [EAS&F] pt. IX)
suggests that ‘For some x, x is fictitious’ is true, on the grounds that ‘Santa
Claus is fictitious’ is true, even though the name ‘Santa Claus’ does not refer to
anything, and no object (e.g., no person) is fictitious. See also Marcus [Q&O].

INTRODUCTION

One last note: throughout this work I have always used
‘real’ and ‘actual’ as synonyms for ‘existent’. Both these words
have uses in which they mean something quite different (e.g.,
both are sometimes used to mean ‘genuine, as opposed to coun-
terfeit’). I never intend these other meanings.

The book consists of three parts. In part I I give a simple
sketch of the main outlines of the theory, some discussion of
motivation, and a sketch of an application of the theory—an
application to fictional objects. Part II contains the formal
development of the theory. I place a great deal of importance on
this part. However, many readers will not be inclined to dwell
in such detail on technical matters, and so I have tried to write
part III in such a way that it can be understood, in general at
least, without having read part II at all. Part III begins with an
informal exposition of the results of part II; I then discuss various
applications of the theory in some detail. The book concludes
with some general characteristics of, and difficulties with, the
theory.